Existing quantum cryptographic schemes are not, as they stand, operable in the presence of noise on the quantum communication channel. Although they become operable if they are supplemented by classical privacy-amplification techniques, the resulting schemes are difficult to analyse and have not been proved secure. We introduce the concept of quantum privacy amplification and a cryptographic scheme incorporating it which is provably secure over a noisy channel. The scheme uses an 'entanglement purification' procedure which, because it requires only a few quantum Controlled-Not and singlequbit operations, could be implemented using technology that is currently being developed. The scheme allows an arbitrarily small bound to be placed on the information that any eavesdropper may extract from the encrypted 1
Quantum cryptography [1] [2] [3] allows two parties (traditionally known as Alice and Bob) to establish a secure random cryptographic key if, firstly, they have access to a quantum communication channel, and secondly, they can exchange classical public messages which can be monitored but not altered by an eavesdropper (Eve). Using such a key, a secure message of equal length can be transmitted over the classical channel. However, the security of quantum cryptography has so far been proved only for the idealised case where the quantum channel, in the absence of eavesdropping, is noiseless. That is because, under existing protocols, Alice and Bob detect eavesdropping by performing certain quantum measurements on transmitted batches of qubits and then using statistical tests to determine, with any desired degree of confidence, that the transmitted qubits are not entangled with any third system such as Eve. The problem is that there is in principle no way of distinguishing entanglement with an eavesdropper (caused by her measurements) from entanglement with the environment caused by innocent noise, some of which is presumably always present.
This implies that all existing protocols are, strictly speaking, inoperable in the presence of noise, since they require the transmission of messages to be suspended whenever an eavesdropper (or, therefore, noise) is detected. Conversely, if we want a protocol that is secure in the presence of noise, we must find one that allows secure transmission to continue even in the presence of eavesdroppers. To this end, one might consider modifying the existing protocols by reducing the statistical confidence level at which Alice and Bob accept a batch of qubits. Instead of the astronomically high level envisaged in the idealised protocol, they would set the level so that they would accept most batches that had encountered a given level of noise. They would then have to assume that some of the information in the batch was known to an eavesdropper. It seems reasonable that classical privacy amplification [4] could then be used to distil, from large numbers of such qubits, a key in whose security one could have an astronomically high level of confidence. However, no such scheme has yet been proved to be secure. Existing proofs of the security of classical privacy amplification apply only to classical communication channels and classical eavesdroppers. They do not cover the new eavesdropping strategies that become possible in the quantum case: for instance, causing a quantum ancilla to interact with the encrypted message, storing the ancilla and later performing a measurement on it that is chosen according to the data that Alice and Bob exchange publicly.
In this paper we present a protocol that is secure in the presence of noise and an eavesdropper. It uses entanglement-based quantum cryptography [2] , but with a new element, an 'entanglement purification' procedure. This allows Alice and Bob to generate a pair of qubits in a state that is close to a pure, maximally entangled state, and whose entanglement with any outside system is arbitrarily low. They can generate this from any supply of pairs of qubits in mixed states with non-zero entanglement, even if an eavesdropper has had access to those qubits.
Our procedure -a Quantum Privacy Amplification algorithm -can be performed by Alice and Bob at distant locations by a sequence of local operations which are agreed upon by communication over a public channel. It is related to the procedure described in [5] , but is much more efficient.
In the idealised theory of entanglement-based quantum cryptography, Alice and Bob have a supply of qubit-pairs, each pair being in the pure, maximally entangled state | φ + ,
where
(| 00 ± | 11 )
These are the so-called 'Bell states' which form a convenient basis for the state space of a qubit-pair. Alice and Bob each have one qubit from each pair. In the presence of noise, each pair would in general have become entangled with other pairs and with the environment, and would be described by a density operator on the space spanned by (1).
Note that any two qubits that are jointly in a pure state cannot be entangled with any third physical object. Therefore any algorithm that delivers qubit-pairs in pure states must also have eliminated the entanglement between any of those pairs and any other system. Our scheme is based on an iterative quantum algorithm which, if performed with perfect accuracy, starting with a collection of qubit-pairs in mixed states, would discard some of them and leave the remaining ones in states converging to | φ + φ + |. If (as must be the case realistically) the algorithm is performed imperfectly, the density operator of the pairs remaining after each iteration will not converge on | φ + φ + |, but will fluctuate in a neighbourhood of it. However, we shall argue that the degree of entanglement with any eavesdropper may nevertheless continue to fall, and can be brought to an arbitrary low value even though the purification to | φ + φ + | remains imperfect.
Our first departure from existing quantum cryptographic schemes is to assume that Eve does interact with all the qubits that are transmitted or received by either Alice or Bob.
Indeed we analyse the scenario that is most favourable for eavesdropping, namely where Eve herself is allowed to prepare all the qubit pairs that Alice and Bob will subsequently use for cryptography. Any realistic situation would also involve environmental noise that is not under Eve's control, but this may be treated as a special case in which Eve is not using the full information available to her.
Suppose, then, that Eve has prepared two qubit pairs in some manner of her own choosing, and sends one qubit from each pair to each of Alice and Bob. Let the density operators of the two pairs beρ andρ ′ respectively. Alice performs a unitary operation
on each of her two qubits; Bob performs the inverse operation
on his. If the qubits are spin-
particles and the computation basis is that of the eigenstates of the z components of their spins, then the two operations correspond respectively to rotations by π/2 and −π/2 about the x axis.
Then Alice and Bob each perform two instances of the quantum Controlled-Not operation
where one pair (ρ) comprises the two control qubits and the other one (ρ ′ ) the two target qubits [6] . Alice and Bob then measure the target qubits in the computational basis (e.g.
they measure the z components of the targets' spins). If the outcomes coincide (e.g. both spins up or both spins down) they keep the control pair for the next round, and discard the target pair. If the outcomes do not coincide, both pairs are discarded.
To see the effect of this procedure, consider the case in which each pair is in stateρ (although the joint state of the two pairs need not be the simple productρ ⊗ρ as they may be entangled with each other). This case will suffice for our applications. We express the density operatorρ in the Bell basis {| φ
the diagonal elements in that basis. Note that the first diagonal element A = φ + |ρ | φ + , which we call the 'fidelity', is the probability that the qubit would pass a test for being in the state | φ + . Thus we wish to drive the fidelity to 1 (which implies that the other three diagonal elements go to 0). Now, in the case where the control qubits are retained, their density operatorρ˜, will have diagonal elements {Ã,B,C,D} which depend on average only on the diagonal elements ofρ:Ã
where N = (A + B) 2 + (C + D) 2 is the probability that Alice and Bob obtain coinciding outcomes in the measurements on the target pair. That is, if the procedure is carried out many times on an ensemble of such pairs of pairs, thenÃ,B,C andD give the average diagonal entries of the surviving pairs. Note that if the averageÃ is driven to 1 then each of the surviving pairs must individually approach the pure state | φ + φ + |.
In passing we note that if the two input pairs have different statesρ andρ ′ with diagonal elements {A, B, C, D} and {A ′ , B ′ , C ′ , D ′ } respectively, then the retained control pairs will, on average, have diagonal elements given by:
, which generalises (7).
Suppose that Eve has provided L pairs of qubits, with density operatorsρ 1 ,ρ 2 , ...,ρ L .
(This is not to say that their overall density operator isρ 1 ⊗ρ 2 ⊗ ... ⊗ρ L , for Eve may have prepared them in an entangled state.) Alice and Bob know nothing about the state preparation, they are simply presented with an ensemble of L pairs of qubits from which they can (if they wish) estimate the average density operatorρ ave :
which characterises the ensemble of pairs.
Alice and Bob now select pairs at random from the ensemble of provided pairs and apply the QPA procedure to pairs of these selected pairs. Thus we may setρ =ρ ave in (7) and we are in effect studying the properties of the map , then after one more iteration, it still exceeds . It is a local attractor. We have been unable to obtain a proof that it is also a global attractor in the
, but we have verified this by computer simulation. In other words, if we begin with pairs whose average fidelity exceeds 1 2 , but which are otherwise in an arbitrary state containing arbitrary correlations with each other and with an eavesdropper, then the states of pairs surviving after successive iterations always converge to the unit-fidelity pure state
Since this is a pure state, none of the surviving pairs is, in the limit, entangled with any other system.
To illustrate the behaviour of the iteration, in Fig.(1) we plot the fidelity as a function of the initial fidelity and the number of iterations, in cases where A > The QPA procedure is rather wasteful in terms of discarded particles -at least one half of the particles (the ones used as controls) is lost at every iteration. In Fig. 2 we plot the efficiency, i.e. the proportion of the initial supply of pairs that remain, after 10 iterations, in units of 2 −10 , as a function of the initial fidelity for initial states with B = C = D. Still the efficiency of our scheme compares favourably with the entanglement purification scheme as described in [5] (about 1000 times more efficient for A close to 0.5) and it can be directly applied to purify states which are not necessarily of the Werner form [7] . 
N.B., this condition is not equivalent to the Horodecki condition [9] characterising mixed states which can violate a generalised Bell inequality (CHSH inequality [10] ). Indeed there exist mixed states which satisfy both our condition (11) and the CHSH inequalities. Thus, analysis of the QPA reveals a more complete characterisation of non-locality than that given by Bell's theorem (c.f. also [11] [12] [13] ). We hope to elaborate this in a forthcoming paper.
The practical implementation of the QPA would require efficient quantum Controlled-Not gates operating directly on information carriers. Perhaps the most promising implementation of gates of this type (in the QPA context) is the one proposed by Turchette et al. [14] . It operates on polarised photons and allows the polarisation of the target photon to be rotated depending on the polarisation of the control photon. Although the current efficiency of the device is quite low, recent experimental progress in this field raises hopes for a successful QPA experiment in the not too distant future.
This research was supported in part by Elsag-Bailey plc. We would like to thank A. Barenco 
